Is the DUI Double-Jeopardy Defense D.O.A. by Miyoshi, Stephanie Ann
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1996
Is the DUI Double-Jeopardy Defense D.O.A.
Stephanie Ann Miyoshi
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Is the DUI Double-Jeopardy Defense D.O.A., 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1273 (1996).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol29/iss3/16
IS THE DUI DOUBLE-JEOPARDY DEFENSE D.O.A.?
I. INTRODUCTION
Drunk driving is one of the most commonly committed crimes in
the United States.1 In fact, for every motorist arrested for driving
under the influence (DUI), there are an estimated 2000 drunk drivers
who go undetected.2 In 1994 alone alcohol contributed to 16,884
traffic fatalities.3
These statistics have not gone unnoticed by the private organiza-
tions and various government agencies that have sought to combat the
problem by supporting or passing tougher laws.4 Their efforts have
resulted in increased penalties for drunk driving and lower legal limits
for blood-alcohol levels.5 One of the most successful statutory wea-
pons in the war against drunk driving, however, has been automatic
license suspensions or revocations for those drivers who either refuse
a test for alcohol or who take the test and score above the legal
limit.6 In some states the refusal or failure allows a police officer to
seize the license and issue a temporary one that automatically expires
in a specified number of days; in other jurisdictions, the officer is
required to notify the state department of motor vehicles, which then
suspends or revokes the license.7 In addition to the suspension or
1. LAWRENCE TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE 3 (3d ed. 1991).
2. Thomas B. Griffen, Note, Zoning Away the Evils of Alcohol, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1373, 1374 (1988).
3. Lori Sham, Drunk and Deadly: Habitual Drinkers Who Drive Defy Treatment,
USA TODAY, June 21, 1995, at 1A, 2A.
4. Griffen, supra note 2, at 1374.
5. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1994). See generally John H. Reese & James B. Borgel,
Summary Suspension of Drunken Drivers' Licenses-A Preliminary Constitutional Inquiry,
35 ADMIN. L. REV. 313 (1983) (discussing how lawmakers have sought to deter drunk
driving).
6. See Griffen, supra note 2, at 1413 (stating that summary suspension of licenses has
been "hailed as an effective tool against drunk driving"); Mark A. Stein, New Drunk
Driving Law Called Success, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at A3, A22 (noting that two
nationwide studies showed that immediate license suspensions were the most effective
deterrent to drunk driving).
7. See ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(c) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032 (1994 & Supp.
1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-691(D) to -694(A) (1989 & Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-65-104(a), -205(a) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353-
13353.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353.2(a) to (c), 23157(e)-(f),
23158.5 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-126(5)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1995); CONN.
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revocation, the driver is generally also subjected to a criminal
prosecution for drunk driving.'
The combination of a license suspension or revocation followed
by a criminal prosecution has lead many DUI defense lawyers to
argue that their clients' rights against double jeopardy have been
violated.' The basis of their contention is that their clients are being
punished twice for the same crime. 10
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b(c)-(d) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 2742(b)-(e) (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(1)(a) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN,
§§ 40-5-67, -67.1 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-255 (Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE 99 18-8002(4)(a), 18-8002A(a) (1987 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625,
para. 5/11-501.1(d)-(f) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 9-30-6-7, -9
(Bums 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §9 3213.9,321J.12 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8-1001(f)(1)(D)-(E), 8-1002(3)(e) (1991 & Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN,
§ 189A.105 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:667(A)(1)-(2)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 2453(3), 2521(5) (West
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1(3) (1992 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 24(4)(c)(4)(f)(1)-(2), 24N (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 9.2325(4)-(7) (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 169.121(4),
169.123(4), (5)(A) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. 99 63-11-23(2), -30(3)
(1989 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.041(1) (Vernon 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 61-8-402(3) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-669.08(4), 39-669.15 (1988 & Supp. 1990);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 484.382(1), 484.384(3), 484.385(1) (Michie 1994); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 265:91-a, :92 (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-111(B), -111.1
(Michie 1994); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(c) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-20-03.1(1), -04, -04.1 (1987 &
Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(D)(1) (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 753, 754 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 813.100(3), 813.130 (1989 & Supp. 1995); 75 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1547(b) (1977
& Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(d) (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 32-23-18 to -19 (Supp. 1995); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
67011-5(2)(d)-(i), 6687b-1(2)(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
44.10(2)(b) (1993 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-223(3)-(4) (1994 & Supp. 1995);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205(a) (1987 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.20.308(6) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1(a)-(c) (1991 & Supp.
1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(9) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102(a),
(d)-(f) (1994 & Supp. 1995). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.4a (West 1990 & Supp.
1995) (stating that a municipal court will suspend the license); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1
(1994) (stating that the law enforcement officer notifies an administrative law judge who
suspends the license); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406(a)(2)-(3) (1993 & Supp. 1995)
(authorizing the suspension of the license by the court handling the DUI offense); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3 (Michie Supp. 1995) (stating that the driver upon refusal should
be taken before a magistrate and tried if the driver again refuses to take the test).
8. Sarah Lavender Smith, Double Jeopardy Defense Delights DUI Attorneys, L.A.
DAILY J., July 25, 1995, at 1, 5.
9. Lawrence Taylor, Drunk Driving License Suspensions: Double Jeopardy Dilemma,
TRIAL, June 1995, at 80, 80 [hereinafter Taylor, License Suspensions].
10. Id.
DUI DOUBLE-JEOPARDY DEFENSE
This double-jeopardy argument has spread rapidly throughout the
country and has convinced trial courts in at least eighteen states to
side with the defendants. The result has been a dismissal of as
many as a thousand drunk-driving cases," and police in certain
jurisdictions have been told to cease confiscation of licenses until
higher courts can settle the matter.1
3
The net effect of these developments is a chaotic enforcement of
DUI laws because some trial or appellate courts accept the double-
jeopardy argument while others in the same jurisdiction do not. For
example, courts in Virginia have not been able to agree on the
double-jeopardy issue, thereby creating the "'crazy situation where it
depends on what courtroom you are in whether it's double jeopardy
or not."' 14 A similar level of disagreement occurred in the appellate
courts of Ohio, forcing the supreme court of that state to consider the
problem. 5 Some attorneys feel the issue will go even further and
will eventually be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 6
Until that happens, however, states with automatic license
suspensions or revocations would be justified in determining that the
11. Harvey Berkmin, Double Jeopardy Downs DUI Cases, NAT'L L.J., June 26, 1995,
at A7, A7; Smith, supra note 8, at 1 (quoting Robert Shearouse, director of public policy
for Mothers Against Drunk Driving, as saying that he wasn't aware of any state with a
license suspension statute in which the double-jeopardy defense had not been used).
12. See Tony Mauro, DUI Policy May Run into Double Jeopardy, USA TODAY, June
21, 1995, at 2A. One person who initially benefitted from the acceptance of the argument
by trial courts is singer John Denver, who was charged with drunk driving after he got into
an accident in August 1994. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss on
Grounds of Double Jeopardy at 3, People v. Deutschendorf (a.k.a. Denver), No. 94 T 491
(Colo. County Court Pitkin County submitted Jan. 16, 1995) [hereinafter Defendant's
Brief]; Richard C. Reuben, Double Jeopardy Claims Gaining, A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 16,
16. At one point, Denver's double-jeopardy argument became so popular among
Colorado DUI attorneys that it was labeled the-"John Denver defense." People, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., July 24, 1995, at A2. Eventually, however, the defense was rejected by a
Colorado court, which concluded that license suspensions coupled with DUI criminal
charges do not raise double-jeopardy claims. Id. The case is currently being appealed.
Telephone Interview with Wallace Prugh, attorney at Gerash, Robinson & Miranda, P.C.
(Sept. 1, 1995) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Prugh
Interview].
13. Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note 9, at 80.
14. Mauro, supra note 12, at 2A (quoting Robert Horan, Jr., Commonwealth Attorney
for Fairfax County, Virginia).
15. State v. Gustafson, 652 N.E.2d 799, 799-800 (Ohio 1995).
16. Reuben, supra note 12, at 16; Smith, supra note 8, at 5; Prugh Interview, supra
note 12; Telephone Interview with Lawrence Taylor, attorney and regent of National
College of DUI Defense, Inc. (Sept. 1, 1991) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review) [hereinafter Taylor Interview].
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DUI double-jeopardy argument is not viable. 7 One primary reason
is that the cases used by double-jeopardy proponents are mostly
inapplicable in the drunk-driving arena. 8 Assuming, arguendo, that
they were applicable, double jeopardy would not be a problem
because legislative history and case law demonstrate that the
suspension or revocation of a drunk motorist's license is an adminis-
trative action primarily designed to ensure public safety.' 9 Further-
more, analogous case law in other areas suggests that such actions do
not violate a defendant's rights against double jeopardy.20 Thus,
with scant legal precedent to support it, the DUI double-jeopardy
defense should be declared D.O.A.-dead on arrival-by courts faced
with this issue.
In order to reach this conclusion, this Comment will provide an
in-depth analysis of the DUI double-jeopardy argument and compare
it with current double-jeopardy jurisprudence. Part II gives an
overview of civil sanctions and civil forfeiture before delineating the
basic elements of double jeopardy, while Part III focuses on drunk-
driving laws in general and outlines the arguments used by double-
jeopardy supporters. Part IV contains a critical analysis of the DUI
double-jeopardy argument, and Part V proposes possible methods that
can be utilized by states to eliminate the effectiveness of this defense
in the future.
II. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SANCTIONS, CIVIL FORFEITURE, AND
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. Civil Sanctions
Sanctions can be either civil or criminal.2 In order to determine
which label applies, a court must first decide whether the legislature
has indicated a preference for either category.' If the legislature
intended a civil sanction, a court must then analyze whether the
penalty is "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
17. See infra part IV.
18. See infra part IV.
19. See infra part IV.
20. See infra part IV.
21. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325-26 (1991) [hereinafter Cheh, Constitutional
Limits].
22. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
D UI DOUBLE-JEOPARDY DEFENSE
intention."'  This is generally determined by reviewing whether the
sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, has historically
been regarded as punishment, requires a finding of scienter, promotes
retribution or deterrence, applies to behavior which is already a crime,
is rationally connected to an alternative purpose, and appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose.24 If the analysis of
those factors leads the court to believe that a sanction is not punitive,
it is considered civil in nature.' In the case of automatic license
suspensions or revocations, most courts have determined that the
sanction is a civil remedy.26
B. Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture is one form of a civil remedy that allows the
government to obtain property that is either believed to be part of the
proceeds of a crime or was used or intended for use in the commis-
sion of a crime.' The suspension or revocation of a driver's license
is similar to civil forfeiture in that it involves the instrument used to
commit a crime-a driver's license.2
23. Id. at 248-49.
24. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); see Ward, 448 U.S.
at 249 (stating that the Kennedy factors, while "neither exhaustive nor dispositive," were
helpful in determining whether a sanction is punitive despite being labeled a civil remedy).
25. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-51.
26. E.g., Loughran v. Superior Court, 699 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Ariz. 1985); Sheffield v.
State, 361 S.E.2d 28, 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill.
1988); Ruge v. Kovach, 467 N.E.2d 673, 677 (Ind. 1984); Severson v. Sueppel, 152 N.W.2d
281,285 (Iowa 1967); Marbut v. Motor Vehicle Dep't, 400 P.2d 982, 984 (Kan. 1965); State
v. Maze, 825 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety
& Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790, 796 (La. 1992); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me.
1995); Neil v. Peterson, 314 N.W.2d 275, 276 (Neb. 1982); State v. Bowles, 311 A.2d 300,
302 (N.H. 1973); State v. Starnes, 254 N.E.2d 675,680 (Ohio 1970); Ohio Bureau of Motor
Vehicles v. Williams, 647 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); City of Cleveland v.
Miller, 646 N.E.2d 1213, 1215 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Cleveland County 1995); City of Cleveland
v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Cleveland County 1995); Price v. Reed,
725 P.2d 1254,1259-60 (Okla. 1986); Blow v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 164 N.W.2d
351, 352 (S.D. 1969); Burrows v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 740 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510,513 (Vt. 1992); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 172
S.E.2d 788, 789 (Va. 1970); Prichard v. Battle, 17 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Va. 1941); see also CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13353.2(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1996) (describing suspension as a "civil
matter"); IDAHO CODE § 18-8002(5) (1987 & Supp. 1995) (describing suspension as a "civil
penalty").
27. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also be Fair?
Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Cheh, Runaway Civil Forfeiture].
28. One could also argue that the car is also an instrument of the crime. Some
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One of the most common uses of civil forfeiture, however, is the
confiscation of such items as houses, money, airplanes, jewelry, and
cars by the federal government for violations of drug or customs
laws.29 The program has been so successful that in 1989 the amount
forfeited to the U.S. government was twenty times the amount
forfeited in 1985.30
C. The Possible Punitive Aspects of Civil Remedies
Because of the excessiveness or punitive nature of some civil
sanctions, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in certain situations,
civil forfeitures and other civil remedies may raise double-jeopardy
problems if preceded or followed by a criminal prosecution.31 The
Court is currently reviewing whether civil forfeitures for drug
violations coupled with criminal charges is barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.32  As will be shown in Part IV, however, the fed-
eral cases involving civil sanctions are inapplicable to situations
concerning the revocation or suspension of a driver's license, and even
if applied to the DUI setting, would still result in the conclusion that
double jeopardy does not occur.
jurisdictions permit forfeiture of the car after a specified number of drunk-driving
convictions. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.5 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994).
29. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409
U.S. 232 (1972); United States v. Pierce, 60 F.3d 886 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. 6380
Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee
Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $145,139,
18 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1994). Two such cases are currently being reviewed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-345); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 16,1996)
(No. 95-346). A decision on these cases is expected by June 1996. David G. Savage,
Supreme Court to Review Rules for Seizure of Assets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1996, at A7.
30. Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 21, at 1327.
31. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); see also United States v. $405,089.23
U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that civil forfeiture for violation of
certain drug and money-laundering laws violated the Double Jeopardy Clause), cert.
granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-346).
32. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3477 (U.S. Jan. 16,1996) (No. 95-345); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d
1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-346).
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D. Double Jeopardy
1. Overview
The prohibition against double jeopardy can be traced back to
the Greeks and Romans.33 By the fourteenth century, England had
begun to adopt the idea, although the practice against it was not
firmly established until the seventeenth century.34 America was also
slow to adhere to its dictates, with only two state constitutions
containing provisions against it when the Bill of Rights was enact-
ed.3
5
Although the details of the Double Jeopardy Clause have been
labeled "numbingly complex,"3 the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution simply states that "[n]o person shall ... [b]e subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."'37 The U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that "no man can be
twice lawfully punished for the same offence. 38 The primary reason
for this is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhanc-
ing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.
39
Thus, there are three primary situations in which double-jeopardy
concerns may be raised: (1) retrial for the same offense after
acquittal; (2) retrial for the same offense after conviction; and (3)
33. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
34. William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411,
414-16 (1993).
35. Id. at 415. The two states were New Hampshire and Pennsylvania. Id at 415 n.25.
36. Id. at 413. The U.S. Supreme Court has referred to its own decisions in this area
as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challerige the most intrepid judicial
navigator." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause applies to the states through the 14th Amendment. Benton, 395 U.S. at
787.
38. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873).
39. Benton, 395 U.S. at 796 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957)).
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multiple punishments for the same offense.4" Administrative license
suspensions and revocations followed by criminal DUI charges
implicate the third category.
2. Basic tests and factors that constitute double jeopardy
As stated above, double jeopardy applies to multiple punishments
for the same offense. This does not, however, prohibit a state from
imposing multiple punishments for one offense in a single proceeding,
as long as the legislature has authorized it." Rather, it prohibits the
imposition of multiple punishments in separate proceedings for the
same offense by the same sovereign.42 Thus, it is important to pin-
point when jeopardy attaches and define the meaning of "same
offense" and "punishment."
The moment when jeopardy attaches is critical because it bars
later prosecution or punishment for the same offense, unless certain
exceptions apply.43 In the arena of civil forfeitures, jeopardy at-
taches when the final judgment of forfeiture is entered by the court,
assuming that the civil forfeiture occurs before the criminal charges
are tried." If the criminal charges occur first, however, jeopardy
attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn at a jury trial,45 or
when the first witness is sworn in for a bench trial.46
Once the attachment of jeopardy is determined, the next step in
double-jeopardy challenges is to ascertain whether a defendant is
being punished twice for the same offense. This is accomplished by
40. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
41. Id. at 451 n.10; Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983).
42. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10; Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-91 (1985)
(holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when different states impose
punishment for the same offense); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922)
(holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the federal and a state
government impose punishment for the same offense).
43. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 429-55
(1991) (discussing the Double Jeopardy Clause); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND
CONCEPTS 726-38 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the Double Jeopardy Clause and its
exceptions). Since these exceptions are not the focus of the DUI double-jeopardy debate,
they are not included in this Comment.
44. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568,569 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3477 (U.S. Jan. 16,1996) (No. 95-345); United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791,795-96
(D. Or. 1994).
45. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978).
46. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
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using the test set forth in B'lockburger v. United States.47 Under the
Blockburger analysis, there are separate offenses if a conviction for
each one requires "proof of an additional fact which the other does
not."48  In the case of successive prosecutions, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not clarified to what extent the facts and elements of the
offenses must be considered.49 As a basic example, however, if one
crime requires proof of A, B, and C, and a second crime requires
proof of A, B, and D, the two crimes are separate offenses."0 If both
crimes consist of of A, B, and C, they would be considered the same
offense.51 Similarly, if the first crime requires proof of A, B, and C,
and the second crime requires proof of A and B, they are also the
same offense for double-jeopardy purposes.5 2
If there is only one offense, the next step is to determine whether
the defendant is being punished. 3 Generally, punishment is defined
as "a penalty or burden imposed as a result of an offense against legal
rules,"'54 the purpose of which is to rehabilitate, deter, incapacitate,
or serve retributive functions.55 Thus, criminal sanctions automati-
cally qualify as punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.56
Even civil sanctions, however, can be punishment if they seek
retribution or deterrence rather than remedial goals. 7
III. THE DUI DOUBLE-JEOPARDY CONTROVERSY
A. History of DUI
Since the turn of the century, the public has been concerned
about the effects of alcohol on persons operating equipment or
machinery. 8 Early laws initially responded to this apprehension by
47. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
48. Id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
49. McAninch, supra note 34, at 465-66; Kathryn A. Pamenter, Note, United States v.
Dixon: The Supreme Court Returns to the Traditional Standard for Double Jeopardy
Clause Analysis, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 575, 576-77 (1994).
50. DRESSLER, supra note 43, at 448.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168; see supra text accompanying note 38.
54. Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 21, at 1356.
55. Id.
56. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); DRESSLER, supra note 43, at
429-30; WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 43, at 725.
57. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
58. Reese & Borgel, supra note 5, at 314.
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requiring law-enforcement officials to evaluate a driver's level of
intoxication through observation of his physical symptoms. 9 By
1939 several states began using chemical tests to determine whether
someone was under the influence, and in 1953 New York became the
first state to enact an implied-consent law requiring a driver to submit
to chemical testing upon request.6°
In 1966 Congress passed the Highway Safety Act,61 which
empowered the Secretary of Transportation to devise highway safety
standards.' Under this authority the Secretary could withhold fed-
eral highway funds from states that did not comply with the crite-
ria.63 The states eventually met these standards by using chemical
tests for alcohol, setting blood-alcohol limits at no greater than .10
percent, and enacting implied-consent laws in which drivers were
deemed to have impliedly consented to subject themselves to the
chemical tests.' 4 Although the program was not as successful as
anticipated,' the use of these financial incentives by Congress was
influential in certain areas.6 For example, all states had adhered to
the mandated setting of blood-alcohol limits by 1971.67
In addition to these regulations, states began to pass laws in the
1960s and 1970s that required those convicted of drunk driving to
seek treatment for alcohol abuse.' These laws were passed after
research by scientists and medical experts showed that many drunk
drivers had alcohol-abuse problems.
6 9
This attempted rehabilitation of drunk drivers, however, was
followed by the 1982 passage of the Federal Alcohol Traffic Safety-
National Driver Register Act.7" The law tied traffic-safety funds to
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Pub. L. No. 89-564, § 101, 80 Stat. 731, 731 (1966).
62. MICHAEL LAURENCE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CALIFORNIA DRUNK-DRIVING
LEGISLATION 4 (1988).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 281
(1993).
66. LAURENCE, supra note 62, at 4.
67. Id.
68. ld. at 5; see, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102.3 (West Supp. 1996).
69. LAURENCE, supra note 62, at 4.
70. Pub. L. No. 97-364, § 101, 96 Stat. 1738, 1738 (1982); Reese & Borgel, supra note
5, at 316.
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a state's implementation of driver's license suspensions for refusal to
take a chemical test or failure of a test.71
More recently, drunk-driving laws have focused on increasing the
severity of punishment, a viewpoint advocated by citizens' groups such
as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD),72 which have lobbied
for mandatory jail sentences and substantial fines.73 Their efforts
have been aided by changed perceptions about the seriousness of
drinking and driving, caused in part by the increasing number of
fatalities and injuries due to drunk drivers.74
B. Current State DUI Laws
In an effort to force suspected drunk drivers to submit to blood,
breath, or urine tests, most jurisdictions have enacted implied-consent
laws.75 These statutes specify that those who drive in the state have
impliedly consented to take such tests.76  In most jurisdictions the
71. Pub. L. No. 97-364, § 101, 96 Stat. 1738, 1739 (1982); Reese & Borgel, supra note
5, at 316.
72. MADD was formed by Candy Lightner in 1980 after her daughter was killed by
a drunk driver. FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 281.
73. LAURENCE, supra note 62, at 5; Reese & Borgel, supra note 5, at 313.
74. At one point in California, for example, drunk-driving-related fatalities comprised
50% of all fatal traffic accidents. LAURENCE, supra note 62, at 7.
75. Reese & Borgel, supra note 5, at 314; see, e.g., Walter Karabian, California's
Implied Consent Statute: An Examination and Evaluation, 1 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 23, 23
(1968).
76. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(a) (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031(a) (1994 & Supp.
1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691(A) (1989 & Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-
202(a) (Michie 1993); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23157(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-227b(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2740
(1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1932(1)(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 40-5-55 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-151(a) (1985 & Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-8002(1) (1987 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para.
5/11-501.1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-6-1 (Bums 1991
& Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.6 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
1001(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.103(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2521 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1(a)(2)
(1992 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(4)(c)(4)(t)(1) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-11-5(1) (1989 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.020(1) (Vernon 1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 61-8-402(1) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-699.08(1) (1988 & Supp. 1990);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.382 (Michie 1994); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 265:84 (1993 & Supp.
1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2(a) (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107(A)
(Michie 1994); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1987 & Supp. 1995); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(A) (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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implied-consent law allows the state to suspend or revoke the license
of a suspected drunk driver who refuses to take a blood, urine, or
breath test.77 Implied-consent laws, or other related drunk-driving
47, § 751(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 813.100(1) (1989 & Supp.
1994); 75 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1(a)
(1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 32-23-10 (1989 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 1995);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-6-44.10(1)(a) (1993 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(a) (1987 & Supp.
1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.20.308(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-l(a) (1991 & Supp.
1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); WYo. STAT. § 31-6-102(a)
(1994). But see CAL- VEH. CODE § 23159.5 (West Supp. 1996) (authorizing express
consent); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301(7)(a)(I) (Supp. 1995) (authorizing express
consent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1932(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing express
consent).
77. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(c) (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691(D) (1989 &
Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-205(a) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH.
CODE § 13353.1(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23157(5)(e) (West
Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-126(2)(a)(II) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-227b(c) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2742(a)-(b) (1985);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(1)(a) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-67(b)(1), -67.1(d)
(Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-255 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-8002(3)-(4) (1987 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/11-501.1(d)-(f)
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 9-30-6-5 to -7 (Bums 1991); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 321J.9 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-1001(f)(1)(D), 8-1002(e)
(1991 & Supp. 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.107 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:667(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2521(5) (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1(b)(3)
(1992 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(4)(c)(4)(f)(1) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1995); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(7) (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 169.121(4), 169.123(4)-(5) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-11-
30(3) (1989 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.041(2) (Vernon 1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 61-8-402(3) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-669.08(4), -669.15 (1988 & Supp. 1990);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 484.382(3), 484.384(3), 484.385(3) (Michie 1994); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 265:91-a, :92 (1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-111.1 (Michie
1994); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-20-04(1) (1987 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(D)(1)
(Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §9 753, 754(A)-(C) (West 1988
& Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 813.100(3), 813.130 (1989 & Supp. 1994); 75 PA. CONST.
STAT. ANN. § 1547(b) (1977 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(d) (Law. Co-op.
1991 & Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-18 to -19 (Supp. 1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 55-10-406(a)(2)-(3) (1993 & Supp. 1995); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
67011-5(2)(d)-(i) (West 1977 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(2)(b) (1993
& Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205(a) (1987 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 46.20.308(6) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-I(a) (1991 &
Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(9) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 31-6-
102(a)(d) (1994 & Supp. 1995). But see ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (1994 & Supp. 1995)
(stating that refusal is a misdemeanor); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.4a (West 1990 & Supp.
1995) (stating that a municipal court can revoke driving privileges); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
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statutes, also allow the states to revoke or suspend a license if a
person takes such a test and scores above the legal limit.78
The revocation or suspension of a license usually occurs in one
of two ways. Under some laws the police officer seizes the person's
driver's license and issues a temporary license that is valid for a
specified number of days; in other jurisdictions, the officer does not
seize the license, but notifies the state department of motor vehicles,
which then suspends or revokes the license.79
In both instances the alleged drunk driver has the right to request
an administrative hearing on the matter." In most jurisdictions the
16.2(c) (1993) (stating that a driver who refuses will be brought before a person authorized
to give oaths, who will then execute an affadavit confirming the refusal); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 31-27-2.1 (1994) (stating that officer notifies an administrative law judge, who then
suspends the license); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3 (Michie Supp. 1995) (stating that a
driver who refuses a test will be taken before a magistrate and later tried if the driver
refuses the magistrate's request for a test).
78. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-104(a)(1) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 13353.2,23158.5 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-126(2)(a)(I) (Supp. 1995);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b(c) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 2742(f) (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(1)(a) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-
67(b)(2)-(3) (Harrison 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 286-255 to -256 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/11-501.1(d)-(f) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 321J.12 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-1001(f)(1)(E), 8-1002(e) (1991
& Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:667(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2453(3) (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-
205.1(b)(3) (1992 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 90, § 24(4)(c)(4)(f)(2) (West
1989 & Supp. 1995); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(7) (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169.123(4)-(5)(A) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-
23(2) (1989 & Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 484.384(3), 484.385(3) (Michie
1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 265:91-a, :92 (1993 & Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-20-03.1 (1987 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(C)(1) (Anderson
1993 & Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754(A)-(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 813.100(3), 813.130 (1989 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-
223(3)-(4) (1994 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205(a) (1987 & Supp. 1994); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5A-1(a)-(c) (1991 & Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(7),
(9) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. 31-6-102(a)-(f) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
79. See supra note 7.
80. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(d) (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-691(D), 28-694(A)
(1989 & Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353-13353.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 42-2-126(8)(a) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b(d)-(f) (West
1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2742(d)-(f) (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.2615(1)(b)(4) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-67.1(g) (Harrison 1994); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 286-259 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8002(4)(b), 18-8002A(a)(6) (1987
& Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/2-118.1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp.
1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-6-10 (Bums 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.13 (West Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1002(f) (1991 & Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 189A.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:668(A) (West
1989 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 2453(8), 2483(1), 2521(8) (West
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official who oversees the hearing is an employee of the state
department of motor vehicles or related state government depart-
ment.81 However, in a few states, a judge conducts the hearing.'
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1(0 (1992 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 24(4)(c)(4)(g), 24N (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.2325(6)(1)-(2) (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123(5)(b)-(c),
(6) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.041(4) (Vernon 1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 61-8-403 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.16 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 484.382 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:91-b (1993 & Supp. 1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:5-30 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-112 (Michie
1994); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-16.2(d) (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE 39-20-05(1)-(3) (1987 & Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754(D) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 813.130(g),
813.410(3) (1989 & Supp. 1995); 75 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1550(a) (1977 & Supp.
1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1(6)(b) (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(e) (Law. Co-
op. 1991 & Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-11 (1989 & Supp. 1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406(c) (1993 & Supp. 1995); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
67011-5(2)(0 , (j)-(k) (West 1977 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-44.10(2)(e), 53-
3-223(6)(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.4 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308(7) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-2(a)
(1991 & Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(8)-(9) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); WYO.
STAT. §§ 31-6-102(0, -103(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995). But see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
90, § 24(4)(c)(4)(f)(1)(iii) (authorizing a hearing for suspensions due to refusal only after
the offender pleads guilty to drunk-driving charges or the charges are dismissed); MISs.
CODE ANN. § 63-11-23(2) (1972 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing a trial on suspension for
testing above the legal limit).
81. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(d) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-126(9)(b)
(Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277b(f) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 2742(0 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(4), (6)(b) (West 1995); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 286-259(d) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-8002A(a)(6) (Supp. 1995); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 321J.13(2) (West Supp. 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:668(A) (West 1989
& Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2483(2) (West Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(4)(c)(4)(g) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 169.123(5)(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.16 (1988); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 265:91-b (1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-112(D) (Michie
1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-05(1)-(3) (1987 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
47, § 754(E) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 813.410(3)(a) (1989 & Supp.
1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406(c) (1993 & Supp. 1995); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 67011-5(0 (West 1977 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(2)(e) (1993 &
Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-2(a) (1991 & Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 343.305(8)-(9) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).
82. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-205(b)-(c) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/2-118.1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 9-30-6-9 (Burns 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24N (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.123(6) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.041(4) (Vernon
1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-403 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1)
(Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994); 75 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1550(a) (1977 & Supp. 1995);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.4 (Michie Supp. 1995); see also MISs. CODE ANN. § 63-11-23(2)
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Under either option, the hearing generally covers some combina-
tion of the following: (1) whether the officer had probable cause or
reasonable grounds for believing the defendant was driving under the
influence; (2) whether the defendant was lawfully arrested;' 4 (3)
whether the defendant refused to take the test or took the test and
scored over the legal limit;'s and (4) whether the defendant was
informed that the license would be revoked or suspended if the
defendant refused or failed the test.8 6 ,
In addition to the license suspension/revocation proceedings, the
state also files criminal DUI charges.' A conviction on these
charges could lead to imprisonment,' a fine, 9 implementation of
an ignition interlock device,' or an additional suspension or restric-
tion of the driver's license.9 These criminal sanctions, combined
with the administrative license suspension or revocation, are at the
heart of the DUI double-jeopardy debate.
(1989 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing a trial for suspensions based on testing over the legal
limit); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1(6)(b) (1994) (authorizing a hearing in front of an
administrative law judge); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. §§ 6687b-1(7)(b), 67011-5(2)(f)
(West Supp. 1995) (authorizing a hearing in front of an administrative law judge).
83. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353(c)(1), 13557(b)(2)(A) (West 1987 & Supp.
1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(7)(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625,
para. 5/2-118.1(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
84. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353(c)(2), 13557(b)(2)(B) (West 1987 & Supp.
1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(7)(a)(2) (West 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para.
5/2-118.1(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(c)(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1995).
85. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353(c)(3), 13557(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(7)(a)(3), (b)(3) (West 1995).
86. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(c)(4) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 322.2615(7)(b)(4) (West 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/2-118.1(b)(3)-(4)
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(c)(3) (McKinney Supp.
1995).
87. Smith, supra note 8, at 1.
88. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160(a)-(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/11-501(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1193(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
89. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23160(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 625, para. 5/11-501(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1193(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
90. Lawrence Taylor, Make it a Single: DUI Dual Punishment May be Unconstitu-
tional, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 7, 1995, at 7 [hereinafter Taylor, Make it a Single].
91. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 625, para. 5/11-501(g) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp.
1995).
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C. The Double-Jeopardy Analysis Proposed by D UI Attorneys
DUI defense attorneys contend that the administrative license
suspension/revocation proceedings coupled with the subsequent crim-
inal trial subjects their clients to multiple punishments for the same
offense.' In order to succeed in this argument, double-jeopardy
proponents must prove that the administrative and criminal matters
are separate proceedings, the two proceedings stem from the same
offense, and the suspension or revocation of a license is punish-
ment.93
1. A license suspension/revocation proceeding and a criminal trial
are separate proceedings for double-jeopardy purposes.
In order for a double-jeopardy issue to arise, the license suspen-
sion/revocation hearing and the criminal trial must be separate
proceedings because the government is allowed to impose multiple
punishments in the same proceeding.94 Thus, DUI defense attorneys
have argued that the two proceedings are separate, partially because
the criminal trial and the license suspension/revocation hearing occur
at different times, but also because one is held in a criminal court-
room, while the other is an administrative hearing generally overseen
by an employee of the state department of motor vehicles.9'
To buttress their claims, DUI defense attorneys analogize their
situation to two federal civil forfeiture cases. In one case, United
States v. McCaslin,96 the court found that the forfeiture action and
criminal trial were two separate proceedings because the indictment
was returned more than eight months after the forfeiture action
began, both actions were overseen by different judges, and the
forfeiture became final five months before the defendant pled guilty
to the criminal charges. 7  In the other case, United States v.
92. See supra part I.
93. See supra part I.
94. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493,500 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365-
69 (1983).
95. See Motion to Dismiss for Double Jeopardy at 14, People v. Kimball, ECR-16735-
A (Cal. Mun. Ct. Tulare County filed Aug. 24, 1995) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss];
Defendant's Brief, supra note 12, at 15-16; supra part III.B.
96. 863 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
97. ad at 1304.
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$405,089.23 United States Currency,98 the court decided there were
two separate proceedings because
[it] fail[ed] to see how two separate actions, one civil and
one criminal, instituted at different times, tried at different
times before different factfinders, presided over by different
district judges, and resolved by separate judgments, consti-
tute the same "proceeding."... [S]uch a coordinated,
manipulative prosecution strategy heightens, rather than
diminishes, the concern that the government is forcing an
individual to 'run the gantlet' more than once.'
Because the driver's license suspension/revocation hearing and
the subsequent criminal trial basically fall within the same pattern as
the two federal cases,"t° DUI lawyers feel that the two proceedings
should be considered separate for double-jeopardy purposes. 01
2. The suspension/revocation of the driver's license and the
subsequent criminal trial stem from the same offense
DUI defense attorneys next argue that the suspension or
revocation of their clients' licenses and the criminal trial which follows
are the result of the same offense."° In other words, both proceed-
ings are the result of either driving under the influence of alcohol or
driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol level. 3 As will be discussed
later, however, this is not always the case."
98. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996)
(No. 95-346).
99. Id. at 1216-17.
100. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
101. In most jurisdictions the two proceedings are indeed separate, however, in a few
states, the license suspension and criminal trial are overseen by the same court. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24N (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 169.123(6) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205(f) (Supp. 1994).
In these jurisdictions a viable argument can be made that the license suspension and
criminal matters are handled in one proceeding and, therefore, double jeopardy does not
apply. People v. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 (Crim. Ct. 1995); State v. Baker, 650
N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clark County 1995); State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195,
205 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Bowling Green 1995).
102. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 5-6; Defendant's Brief, supra note 12, at 7;
Murphy v. Virginia, 896 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1995); Anderson v. Macduff, 143 N.Y.S.2d
257 (Sup. Ct. 1955); State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clark County 1995);
State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Franklin County 1995).
103. Defendant's Brief, supra note 12, at 17; Murphy, 896 F. Supp. at 580; Anderson,
143 N.Y.S.2d at 259; Baker, 650 N.E.2d at 1382; Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d at 536-37.
104. See infra part IV.A.
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Other DUI lawyers argue that their clients are being punished
twice for the same offense if both proceedings involve the same
"factual situation,"105 a test that they contend was used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Halpert°6 and Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch."°
3. License revocation/suspension is a form of punishment for
double-jeopardy purposes
The heart of the DUI double-jeopardy defense is that the license
suspension/revocation is punishment under the Fifth Amendment. To
buttress this central element of their claim, DUI defense attorneys
generally use three U.S. Supreme Court cases." 8 None of these
cases deal specifically with drunk driving or the suspension/revocation
of driver's licenses, but the language in these cases is nevertheless
applied to the DUI arena. Because these cases are so integral to the
double-jeopardy debate, an analysis of each case is necessary in order
to ascertain whether the cases are in fact applicable to the DUI
setting.
a. United States v. Halper'"
The basis of all DUI double-jeopardy claims resides in Halper, a
fraud case in whichthe defendant was convicted, sentenced to prison,
and fined $5000.110 He was then ordered to pay an additional $1170
sanction after the federal government filed an action against him
under the civil False Claims Act. 1'
In assessing the defendant's double-jeopardy argument, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that a civil remedy is not punishment when it
approximates government damages and actual costs.112  If it is
extreme and divorced from the government's damages, however, the
105. See Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief at 13, People v. Deutschendorf (a.k.a.
Denver), No. 95 CR 23 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Pitkin County submitted June 20, 1995)
[hereinafter Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief]; Defendant's Brief, supra note 12, at 17.
106. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
107. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
108. Another case periodically cited by DUI defense attorneys is United States v.
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477
(U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-346).
109. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
110. Id. at 437-40.
111. Id. at 438-40.
112. Id. at 446.
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civil remedy is punitive in nature and raises double-jeopardy con-
cerns.
113
In an effort to further delineate its stance, the Court went on to
assert that a civil remedy or sanction is punitive when it serves
retributive or deterrent functions." 4 It is this section of the case
that has created differing interpretations in the double-jeopardy arena
because of two conflicting sentences. After first stating that a civil
sanction is punitive if it is not "solely to serve a remedial pur-
pose,'... the Court in the next sentence expressly held that a civil
sanction is punishment if it "may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.""' 6
b. Austin v. United States'
17
Four years after Halper, the U.S. Supreme Court again delved
into the area of civil sanctions. Although Austin is frequently cited
by DUI double-jeopardy proponents, it actually deals with an
excessive fines issue under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion, rather than a double-jeopardy issue under the Fifth Amend-
ment."' In Austin the defendant pled guilty to one count of cocaine
possession 'with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years
in prison."9 Shortly thereafter, the United States filed an in rem
action seeking forfeiture of Austin's mobile home and auto-body
shop, where the drugs were stored and the drug sale occurred. 2
In determining whether the forfeiture was an excessive fine under
the Eighth Amendment, the Court opted to use the portion of the
Halper case which stated that a civil sanction is punishment if it does
not solely serve a remedial purpose."' To ascertain whether the
forfeiture in question served such a purpose, the Court first looked at
the historical usage of forfeitures and determined that they generally
served punitive goals."z ' It then noted that the forfeiture was tied
113. Id. at 442.
114. Id. at 448.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
117. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
118. Id. at 2803. At least one federal appellate court has stated that the Austin case
applies to double-jeopardy cases. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219.
119. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2806.
122. Id. at 2806-10.
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directly to the commission of drug offenses and that the focus of the
forfeiture statute was on the culpability of the owner of the proper-
ty."3 As a result, the forfeiture did not serve solely a remedial
purpose and was a punishment subject to the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against excessive fines.' 24
c. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch"z
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case to address whether a
civil sanction is punishment is Kurth Ranch. The case dealt with
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act,'26 which allowed imposition
of a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs.'27 Under
the law, the tax would be either ten percent of the assessed market
value of the drug or a specified amount that varied from drug to
drug." More importantly, the tax would only be levied after any
-state or federal fines and forfeitures had been imposed.29
The defendants in the case were taxed pursuant to the Act after
pleading guilty to growing and selling marijuana on their farm 3 ' and
settling a companion forfeiture action in which the government
attempted to obtain the cash and equipment used in the drug
violations.'
In assessing whether the Montana tax was punishment, thus
raising a double-jeopardy issue, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
the Halper test 32 was not applicable in a tax situation.' 33 Instead,
the Court used six factors to analyze the Montana statute: (1) the tax
was excessive and had a deterrent purpose; (2) the tax was condi-
tioned on the commission of a crime; (3) the tax was imposed only
after the taxpayer was arrested for the precise conduct that gave rise
to the tax; (4) people arrested for possession of drugs were the only
ones subject to the tax; (5) the taxed activity was completely
forbidden; and (6) the tax was levied on goods that the taxpayer
123. Id. at 2810-12.
124. Id. at 2812.
125. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
126. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (repealed 1995); Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct.
at 1941 n.2.
127. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941.
128. ld
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1942.
131. Id.
132. See supra part III.C.3.a.
133. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
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neither owned nor possessed when the tax was imposed.M All of
these factors made the tax appear to be a punishment rather than a
revenue-enhancing scheme 135 and thus contained "anomalies, too
far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to
escape characterization as punishment.
1 36
d. applying the double-jeopardy cases to DUI
DUI double-jeopardy proponents rely on the Supreme Court's
statement in Halper that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punish-
ment." 37 They buttress their use of this quote by pointing out that
the Austin Court used the same statement in determining whether the
fine at issue in that case could constitute punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.1 38  Thus, the main contention of double-jeopardy
proponents is that the revocation or suspension of a driver's license
is not "solely" remedial and instead implicates a punitive or deterrent
purpose.
139
To prove their point, defense attorneys often apply the most
favorable prongs or factors used by the Court in Austin and Kurth
Ranch." These include the historical understanding of forfeiture
as punishment; a determination that the forfeiture is for a forbidden
act, focuses on the culpability of the defendant, and is tied directly to
the commission of a crime; and an evaluation that the forfeiture is
excessive or saddled with a punitive purpose."
Thus, DUI defense attorneys contend that the arrest and
suspension/revocation procedures stem from the forbidden act of
driving under the influence. 42 These suspensions and revocations
focus on the culpability of the defendant and are tied directly to the
commission of a crime because they are only imposed after a police
134. Id. at 1946-48.
135. Id. at 194748.
136. Id. at 1948.
137. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
138. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
139. See infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
140. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 8-10; Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief,
supra note 105, at 17; Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note 9, at 82-84.
141. Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note 9, at 83-84.
142. See Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief, supra note 105, at 17-18; Taylor, License
Suspensions, supra note 9, at 83-84.
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officer either pulls a driver off the road for appearing to be drunk or
the driver fails a chemical test detecting alcohol.'43 DUI attorneys
reinforce their argument by pointing out that a few jurisdictions
reinstate a suspended or revoked license if the defendant is later
acquitted of the criminal DUI charge.1"
The chief focus of their argument, however, is that the suspension
or revocation of a driver's license is meant to punish or deter.145
One way the suspension or revocation accomplishes this is by the
deprivation and hardship allegedly imposed on drunk drivers.'46
Under this argument, it is punitive because society is mobile and
people depend on their cars.47 Some people may also require a
vehicle or a valid driver's license to complete their job duties, and a
suspension or revocation may endanger their employment or cause
them to lose promotions) 48
Another argument made by defense attorneys is that the
legislature understood the provisions of the statute to serve either
deterrent or punitive purposes.' 49 Defense attorneys cite to news
articles about the statutes or to their legislative histories to make this
argument.151 For example, news articles about the impending passage
or implementation of suspension/revocation bills can sometimes
contain statements by supporters which indicate that they considered
the law to be punitive or deterrent in nature. In California, for
instance, State Senator John Seymour, the co-author of a suspension
bill, echoed this sentiment, telling a reporter that the law would bring
143. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 17-18; Defendant-Appellee's Answer
Brief, supra note 105, at 17-18; Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note 9, at 82-83.
144. Taylor Interview, supra note 16.
145. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 7-13; Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief,
supra note 105, at 15-25.
146. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 7-13; Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief,
supra note 105, at 15-25.
147. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 15-16; Defendant-Appellee's Answer
Brief, supra note 105, at 23-25; Karabian, supra note 75, at 43 (stating that driving in
California is a practical necessity).
148. See Berkman, supra note 11, at A7 (quoting William C. Head, DUI lawyer and
cofounder and treasurer of the National College for DUI Defense as stating: "Taking
away a driver's license can mean taking away a job and then a house.").
149. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 13; Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note
9, at 82; Taylor, Make it a Single, supra note 90, at 7.
150. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 13; Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note
9, at 80; Taylor, Make it a Single, supra note 90, at 7.
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"swift and certain penalties for those who choose to drink and
drive."
, 51
In addition to a few quotes from a handful of news articles, DUI
attorneys also contend that the legislative histories of the revoca-
tion/suspension laws support the contention that lawmakers under-
stood the statutes to serve a deterrent or punitive purpose. For
example, comments contained in the third reading of California's
then-proposed license suspension law state that "the swift and sure
suspension or revocation of a person's driver's license.., has proven
to be a most successful deterrent."152  A legislative analysis of the
bill referred to the suspension as a "penalty" from the standpoint of
DUI offenders. '  In addition, MADD-a key supporter of the
bill-stated in several letters that the purpose of the legislation was
in part to deter others."s  Similar references to punishment and
deterrence are contained in the legislative histories of statutes of other
states.
155
Thus, DUI double-jeopardy proponents choose the most powerful
indications of a punitive or deterrent purpose that they can find. As
will be shown in Part IV, however, DUI lawyers not only misapply
case law, but their findings are also largely countered by more
persuasive evidence.
151. Matt Lait & Davan Maharaj, In New Law, Drunks Face Instant Loss of Licenses,
L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1990, at B1.
152. CALIFORNIA SENATE THIRD READING OF S.B. 1623, 1989-1990 Regular Sess. 3
(1989) [hereinafter THIRD READING OF S.B. 1623].
153. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1623, 1989-1990 Regular Sess. 2
(1989) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1623].
154. Letter from Sherry Metcalf, President, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Orange
County Chapter, to Bill Lockyer, California State Senator (Apr. 28, 1989) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Letter from Shirley Graves, Legislative Liaison,
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, to Bill Lockyer, California State Senator (Apr. 14, 1989)
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
155. For example, Colorado Representative James Lee, at various times during the
passage of Colorado's license suspension law, stated that one, although not the sole
purpose of the statute, was to deter people from drinking and driving, a view that was
echoed by the Governor's Task Force. Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief, supra note
105, at 21-22; COLORADO GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DRUNK DRIVING, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 14 (1983). Colorado Representative Ronald Strahle went even further and
voiced his concern that the law would result in double punishment for the offender.
Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief, supra note 105, at 23. The current revoca-
tion/suspension statute, however, specifically states that it is designed to remove safety
hazards from the road and thereby protect the public. See infra note 240.
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D. Success and Failure-Mostly Failure-of the Double-Jeopardy
DUI Defense in State Courts
1. Trial courts
The double-jeopardy drunk-driving defense has had its greatest
success in trial courts, where the argument has resulted in dismissal
of the criminal charges in at least eighteen states."5 6 At least one
federal district court has also indicated that the defense is valid.
1 1
7
Some attribute the early success of the double-jeopardy argument
to its rapid use by defense attorneys, who caught prosecutors off-
guard. 5 8 In an effort to combat this advantage, the National
Commission on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, the National
Traffic Law Center, and MADD have been distributing prosecutorial
resource kits on this issue.159
Despite their efforts, some trial courts continue to agree with the
double-jeopardy defense, even though other trial courts in the same
jurisdiction do not recognize it."6 This lack of uniformity at the
trial-court level has led defense attorneys and prosecutors to seek
appellate review.
156. See Berkman, supra note 11, at A7; New Drunk Driving Defense Is Successful in
18 States, LAW. WKLY. USA, June 5, 1995, at 95; Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note
9, at 80. The 18 states include Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, South
Carolina, and Washington. New Drunk Driving Defense Is Successful in 18 States, supra,
at 95.
157. Murphy v. Virginia, 896 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1995). In the Murphy case, the
defendant brought a habeus corpus proceeding in federal court to obtain an injunction on
double-jeopardy grounds to halt the state criminal trial. Id. The court, however, did not
grant the injunction because it ruled that the defendant was required to seek such relief
in state court. Id. at 584.
158. See Berkman, supra note 11, at A7.
159. See id. These kits contain citations to cases that can be used to fight the defense,
background information about double jeopardy, and other helpful tips. Memorandum
from Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Subcommittee on Double Jeopardy/ALR, to
Members of the Coalition for ALR (Mar. 29, 1995) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review); Memorandum from the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances, Subcommittee on Double Jeopardy/ALR, to Members of the Coalition for
ALR (Mar. 29, 1995) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
160. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; see also State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d
1376, 1390 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Clark County 1995) (holding that double jeopardy did not bar
criminal prosecution); State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 539 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Franklin
County 1995) (holding that a double-jeopardy defense was valid); State v. Uncapher, 650
N.E.2d 195, 207 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Bowling Green 1995) (holding that double jeopardy did
not bar criminal prosecution); City of Cleveland v. Miller, 646 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. Cleveland County 1995) (holding that a double-jeopardy defense was invalid).
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2. Appellate courts
Although the DUI double-jeopardy defense has found favor with
many trial courts, it has met with little success in the appellate arena.
In fact all of the appellate courts that have addressed the issue have
condemned the defense,"'1 with the exception of the Ohio appellate
courts, which are split on the issue. 62
3. State supreme courts
For double-jeopardy proponents, the results of DUI cases in state
supreme courts are even more disheartening because the states that
have heard the issue refuse to accept the argument. 63
Despite the setback, double-jeopardy advocates remain hopeful
that the tide will turn and that a favorable ruling may be in store."6
Opponents, however, remain skeptical."6
161. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); State v. Nichols, 819 P.2d
995 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Ellis v. Pierce, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1991);
Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Gomez v. State, 621
So. 2d 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); Nolen v. State, 463 S.E.2d 504 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Jackson v. State, 462
S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Spilde, 536 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269
(Neb. Ct. App. 1995); Schreiber v. Motor Vehicles Div., 802 P.2d 706 (Or. Ct. App. 1990),
review denied, 810 P.2d 855 (Or. 1991); Neaves v. State, 767 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989); Walton v. State, 831 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Tench v. Commonwealth, 462
S.E.2d 922 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
162. See, e.g., New Drunk Driving Defense Rejected by Eight Appeals Courts, LAW.
WKLY. USA, July 3, 1995, at 1 (describing some of the conflicting decisions in Ohio).
163. State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928 (Haw. 1995); State v. Talavera, 905 P.2d 633 (Idaho
1995); Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992); State
v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265 (Me. 1995); Maryland v. Jones, 666 A.2d 128 (Md. 1995); Luk
v. Commonwealth, 658 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1995); Neil v. Peterson, 314 N.W.2d 275 (Neb.
1982); State v. Cassady, 662 A.2d 955 (N.H. 1995); State v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044 (N.M.
1995); State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Vt.
1992); see also Dickinson v. Powell, 539 N.W.2d 869 (N.D. 1995) (following the holding in
State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995), and reversing the earlier order of
dismissal based upon the Double Jeopardy Clause).
164. See Prugh Interview, supra note 12 (quoting Prugh as stating that recent negative
decisions are "not indicative of how it will turn out in the end" because "trial courts aren't
pulling things out of thin air"); Taylor Interview, supra note 16 (stating that "it's a
question of time before there is a favorable decision").
165. See Telephone Interview with Gordon B. Scott, deputy district attorney for
Sonoma County (Sept. 1, 1995) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter Scott Interview] (stating that no "principled analysis" could result in a finding
that double-jeopardy rights were infringed).
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IV. DUI-RELATED LICENSE SUSPENSIONSIREVOCATIONS
COUPLED WITH CRIMINAL CHARGES Do NOT CONSTITUTE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Although DUI double-jeopardy proponents make a variety of
arguments to support their cause, their contentions should be declared
dead on arrival. One reason is because much of their argument is
supported by inapplicable case law. Moreover, even if the cases were
applicable, the most supportable conclusion would be that license
suspensions/revocations are remedial measures and, therefore, double
jeopardy does not arise.
A. The Defendant in a D UI Case Is Not Being Punished Twice for
the Same Offense if the Defendant's License Was Previously
Suspended or Revoked for Refusal to Take a Chemical Test
Under the Blockburger test, there are two offenses for double-
jeopardy purposes if each alleged violation requires "proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."'6
In the context of license suspensions/revocations for refusal to
take a chemical test, the Blockburger analysis clearly shows that the
suspension/revocation hearing and the subsequent criminal trial are
dealing with two separate offenses. This is because the the hearing
requires proof that (1) the officer had probable or reasonable cause
to believe the defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol;167 (2) the driver was lawfully arrested; 1' (3)
the driver was told of the consequences of refusal; 69 and (4) the
driver refused nonetheless.7 In contrast, the state is not required
166. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see supra part II.D.1.
167. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353(c)(1), 13557(b)(2)(A)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(7)(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 1995); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/2-118.1(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1193(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
168. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353(c)(2), 13357(b)(2)(B) (West 1987 & Supp.
1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(7)(a)(2) (West 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para.
5/2-118.1(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1996).
169. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(c)(4) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 322.2615(7)(b)(4) (West 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/2-118.1(b)(3)-(4)
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(b) (McKinney Supp.
1995).
170. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353(c)(3), 13557(b)(2)(C) (West 1987 & Supp.
1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(7)(a)(3), (b)(3) (West 1995).
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at a criminal trial to prove that the defendant refused to take a
chemical test, but, in the absence of a valid chemical test, must only
prove that the defendant was in fact driving under the influence of
alcohol.17' In California, for example, proof of driving under the
influence would entail showing that the defendant was unable "to
drive a vehicle with the caution characteristic of a sober person of
ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
1 2
Because both proceedings deal with "proof of an additional fact which
the other does not,"'73 the defendant is not being punished twice for
the same offense, and the Double Jeopardy Clause does not ap-
ply.174
Some double-jeopardy proponents attempt to evade this
conclusion by contending that the Blockburger test should not be
used.175 They argue that Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch mandate
that there is one offense if both proceedings arise from the same set
of factual circumstances.176 None of these cases, however, supports
171. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191(a)(3) (1989) (defining under the influence as
"incapable of safely driving"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(A)(1) (Supp. 1995)
(defining under the influence as "person is impaired to the slightest degree"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 42-4-1301(1)(f) (Supp. 1995) (defining under the influence as "substantially
incapable.. . [of] exercis[ing] clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the
safe operation of a vehicle"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-4(1) (1985 & Supp. 1992) (defining
under the influence as the consumption of an amount of alcohol that is "sufficient to
impair the person's normal mental faculties or ability to care for oneself and guard against
casualty"); IND. CODE § 9-13-2-86(4) (1991) (defining under the influence as a "loss of
normal control of a person's faculties to an extent that endangers a person"); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 9.2325(2) (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995) (defining under the influence as "visibly
impaired"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 3731(a)(1) (1977 & Supp. 1995) (defining under the
influence as "incapable of safe driving"); WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233(b) (1977 & Supp. 1994)
(defining under the influence as "incapable of safely driving").
172. People v. Weathington, 231 Cal. App. 3d 69, 78, 282 Cal. Rptr. 170, 173 (1991)
(citing People v. Cortes, 214 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12,13,263 Cal. Rptr. 113,114 (1989)); see
CAL VEH. CODE § 23152(a) (West Supp. 1996); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCIONS:
CRIMINAL (CALJIC) No. 16.831 (1988 & Supp. 1995); People v. Schoonover, 5 Cal. App.
3d 101, 107, 85 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (1970).
173. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
174. See People's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Double
Jeopardy at 2,7, People v. Duetschendorf (a.k.a. Denver), No. 94 T 491 (Colo. County Ct.
Pitkin County submitted Jan. 23, 1995) [hereinafter People's Response]; Anderson v.
Macduff, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955); State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. Clark County 1995); State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Bowling
Green 1995).
175. Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds
of Double Jeopardy at 9, People v. Deutschendorf (a.k.a. Denver), No. 94 T 491 (Colo.
County Ct. Pitkin County submitted Mar. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Defendant's Reply Brief].
176. lL
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the proponents' argument.177 Instead, the Court seemed to assume
that the civil and criminal proceedings dealt with the same offense
since it never engaged in any sort of same-offense analysis.178
Moreover, the Court has recently reiterated its support of the
Blockburger test.
179
Assuming for the sake of argument that a same-facts analysis was
used, the result would still show that a test refusal and driving under
the influence are different offenses. Although both arise from the
defendant's alleged inability to drive due to alcohol, the suspension
for a refusal is not based on that inability, but rather, is based on the
driver's unwillingness to submit to a chemical test.' As a result,
the factual context of the criminal and administrative proceedings are
different and would constitute two separate offenses.
B. The Cases Cited Most Frequently by DUI Double-Jeopardy
Proponents Are Not Applicable to the DUI Setting
As stated above,"8 ' DUI double-jeopardy proponents generally
use United States v. Halper,'" Austin v. United States,83 and De-
partment of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch 84 to support their argument
that license suspension/revocation followed by a criminal trial triggers
a double-jeopardy violation. None of the cases, however, are
177. Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief, supra note 105, at 13; Defendant's Brief,
supra note 12, at 12.
178. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941-48 (1994);
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803-12 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 437-47 (1989). If the Court did engage in a same-offense analysis using the
Blockburger test, it would have reached the conclusion in all three cases that there was
only one offense. For example, in Halper, both the civil and criminal proceedings required
proof that the defendant defrauded a medical insurer. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38.
Similarly, in Austin, the civil and criminal proceedings required proof that the defendant
had engaged in drug violations. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. Finally, in Kurth Ranch, both
proceedings required proof that the defendants had grown marijuana on their property.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941-43.
179. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993).
180. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 13557(b)(1), 13558(c)(1), 23157 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615(1)(a),
(7)(b) (West 1995); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(4)-(7) (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(b)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 67011-1 to -5(2)(d)-(e) (West 1977 & Supp. 1995).
181. See supra part III.C.3.a-c.
182. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
183. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
184. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
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applicable to the drunk-driving arena and, thus, they should not be
used to support a double-jeopardy argument.'
One primary reason the cases are inapplicable is that they do not
involve drunk driving or the suspension of driver's licenses or
elements closely related to those issues.186 Instead, Halper focuses
on the civil forfeiture of substantial amounts of money following a
prosecution for fraudulent acts."8 Kurth Ranch, on the other hand,
deals with a state tax imposed after conviction of drug charges,"
while Austin determines whether a civil fine for drug offenses was
excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 8 9  Thus, Austin has
nothing to do with the Double Jeopardy Clause. Furthermore, since
all of the cases are factually distinct from drunk driving or driver's
license suspensions, they are inapplicable in this area and the attempts
to apply them have resulted in a somewhat implausible use of the
Court's holdings.
An example of this implausible use is the frequent invocation of
the Halper analysis by DUI attorneys, even though the Court has
placed limits on its applicability. One way the Court has done this is
by refusing to apply it to certain situations, such as the tax setting in
Kurth Ranch, where the Halper analysis was deemed an "inappropri-
ate" test. 90 Another way the Court has limited the applicability of
Halper is by stating that it is only meant to be applied in the "rare
185. One attorney has called the double-jeopardy defense a "slice and dice approach
to legal analysis" in which "[v]arious quotations of seemingly related language are cooked
together to make a double jeopardy stew." Return to Writ of Prohibition at 19, In Re
DeTourney, No. SCV-210833 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sonoma County filed July 12, 1995)
[hereinafter Writ of Prohibition].
186. See Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 205 (Md. Ct. App. 1993); City of Cleveland
v. Miller, 646 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Cleveland County 1995); City of
Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209, 1211-12 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Cleveland County 1995);
Scott Interview, supra 165; supra part III.C.3.a-c. As noted previously, supra note 108,
DUI double-jeopardy proponents periodically cite to United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996)
(No. 95-346). The $405,089.23 U.S. Currency case, however, does not deal with the
suspension of drivers' licenses or drunk driving. Instead, the case involves the civil
forfeiture of money and property coupled with a criminal prosecution for drug offenses.
Id. at 1214.
187. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38.
188. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941-42.
189. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803; see Ellen Silverman Zimiles, Do Halper and Austin Put
Civil Forfeiture in Jeopardy?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 189, 198 (1994) (stating that Austin
dealt with forfeiture of property involved in drug trafficking and that other statutes may
not be construed in the same manner by the Court).
190. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944, 1948.
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case" where a fixed penalty subjects a "small-gauge offender" to an
overwhelming sanction that is disproportionate to the costs incurred
by the government.91 License suspensions and revocations are
safety measures that do not compensate the government for any costs
it has incurred."9 Therefore, license suspensions and revocations
are not the "rare case[s]" contemplated by Halper. As one commen-
tator stated, Halper gives guidance for monetary penalties, but
anything beyond this is not clear." Thus, Halper has limited
applicability in other contexts and should not be applied to the drunk-
driving arena.
Rather than attempting to apply Halper or the other inapplicable
cases, double-jeopardy proponents should instead look to existing
state precedent which is on point and binding authority on this
matter. These cases show that courts have almost uniformly held that
suspension of a driver's license is primarily an administrative,
remedial measure. 94 Because the suspension is not punishment, no
double-jeopardy rights are violated. 9
C. Even if Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch Are Applied to the
D UI Arena, the Suspension or Revocation of Driver's Licenses Does
Not Constitute Punishment for Double-Jeopardy Purposes
Assuming, arguendo, that Halper,'96 Austin,'97 and Kurth
Ranch... did apply to the DUI situation, the suspension or revoca-
tion of a driver's license would still not constitute punishment for
double-jeopardy purposes. 99
191. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
192. See infra part IV.C.2.
193. Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 21, at 1378; see also State v. Zerkel, 900
P.2d 744, 750-51 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the Halper test does not apply to
license suspensions); Baldwin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1630,
1642, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 430 (1995) (stating that license revocation is nothing like the
tax in Kurth Ranch); Miller, 646 N.E.2d at 1215 (stating that since there are no penalties
assessed, Halper and Kurth Ranch are inapplicable); Nutter, 646 N.E.2d at 1211-12 (arguing
that because there were no monetary sanctions, the analysis used in the cases cited by DUI
offenders is not applicable).
194. See infra part IV.C.2.
195. See infra part IV.C.2.
196. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
197. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
198. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
199. Some attorneys feel that United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), and Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), should be used to determine whether a sanction
is punitive. Writ of Prohibition, supra note 185, at 6-7. Under this scenario, Ward is used
DUI DOUBLE-JEOPARDY DEFENSE
1. Halper has been misinterpreted by DUI double-jeopardy
proponents
DUI double-jeopardy proponents have interpreted Halper to
mean that any civil sanction which carries even the slightest tinge of
punishment is punishment for double-jeopardy purposes.2" Invari-
ably, they come to this conclusion by misstating the holding of Halper
as being: "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have
come to understand the term." '' That statement, however, is not
the Court's expressed holding. Instead, the Court clearly states in the
next sentence, "We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal
prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the
extent that the [civil] sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as deterrent or retribution.
' 202
Thus, the actual holding of the Court states that a sanction is
punishment, not if it can "solely" be defined as remedial, but rather,
if it can "only" be defined as serving a deterrent or retributive
function. The rest of the case indicates that this is indeed the true
holding because the majority then states that a court should balance
the amount of government damages and costs against the actual
sanction that was imposed."0 3 Only if the sanction is disproportion-
ate to the damage caused and "bears no rational relation to the goal
of compensating the Government for its loss" is the sanction deemed
to determine whether the sanction is civil or criminal in nature. Id. Once something is
determined to be civil in nature, Mendoza is then used to determine whether the sanction
is so punitive in purpose or effect that it negates the noncriminal intention of the
legislature. Id. Most courts have ruled, however, that the WardlMendoza test is not
applicable when determining whether a civil sanction is punishment for double-jeopardy
purposes. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1218; Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489,496 (7th
Cir. 1995). Thus, it will not be applied in this Comment.
200. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 6-8; Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief,
supra note 105, at 5, 15; Defendant's Brief, supra note 12, at 9.
201. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). This is the interpretation of the holding
used in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219.
202. Halper, 490 U.S. at 435, 448-49 (emphasis added). For double-jeopardy purposes
it does not appear to matter whether the civil sanction precedes or follows the criminal
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 178 (1990).
203. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
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a punishment for double-jeopardy purposes?'°  The use of this
balancing standard is a clear indication that the Court contemplated
that as long as something is "fairly remedial" it is not punishment. If
the "solely remedial" language was intended to be the holding, the
balancing standard that the Court later describes would be irrelevant.
Instead, the Court could have looked at whether there was even the
slightest indication of a nonremedial purpose without ever engaging
in a full-blown recitation of the balancing standard that should be
applied in future cases.
Furthermore, the "solely remedial" language flies in the face of
the Court's later statement that the "rule [is] for the rare case ... [of
a] small-gauge offender [subjected] to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused."2 5 Not only does
this statement reiterate the balancing standard, it also emphasizes that
civil sanctions should infrequently be labeled as punitive. This would
not be the case if the "solely remedial" standard was intended to be
used. Since almost all civil remedies "carry the sting of punish-
ment,"2" the rule would not be applied to just the rare case, but to
practically all cases.
The same conclusion is reached when an analysis is undertaken
of how the U.S. Supreme Court later defines its Halper holding and
how lower federal and state courts have interpreted the case.
Thus, while DUI defense attorneys argue that the "solely
remedial" language was cited as the holding in Austin,2" the Court
in that case also stated that Halper stands for the proposition that the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a second sanction that may not be
fairly characterized as remedial.20 8 Furthermore, Austin is not a
double-jeopardy case, but is actually a case based on the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.2' As a result, even if the
"solely remedial" language is applicable in the Eighth Amendment
context, it is not necessarily applicable in the Fifth Amendment
context, especially since the Halper case itself is a Fifth Amend-
ment/double-jeopardy case and is, therefore, more directly applicable
to other Fifth Amendment/double-jeopardy cases.
204. Id. at 449.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 447 n.7.
207. Defendant's Reply Brief, supra note 175, at 5; Defendant's Brief, supra note 12,
at 10.
208. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4.
209. Id. at 2803.
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An additional indication that the "solely remedial" language in
Halper is not the binding precedent in Fifth Amendment cases is the
Court's statement in Kurth Ranch describing the Halper holding as
barring "'an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a
deterrent or retribution.' , 210  Thus, Kurth Ranch, which is also a
Fifth Amendment/double-jeopardy case, asserts that a civil sanction
does not have to be "solely remedial" to be nonpunitive.
The state courts and lower federal courts generally agree with
this assessment. Although a handful of cases in the drunk driving or
civil forfeiture arena have stated that the Halper holding is the "solely
remedial" line,21' most cases in these areas have stated that the
"fairly remedial" sentence is the holding.212 These courts further
state that Halper requires a court to apply to the "rare case" a test of
balancing the sanction against the costs to the government or,
alternatively, determining whether the sanction can be seen as only
having a deterrent or retributive function.2
210. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945 (emphasis added) (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at
448-49).
211. United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791, 797 (D. Or. 1994); Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223,
224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Miller, 646 NE.2d 1213, 1215 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. Cleveland County 1995); Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209,1211 (Ohio Mun.
Ct. Cleveland County 1995).
212. United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29,36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 55 (1992); United States v. Woods, 949 F.2d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 961 (1992); United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263,266-67 (10th Cir. 1990); Mayers,
897 F.2d at 1127; Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 825 (E.D. Wash. 1994); State
v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Baldwin v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1630, 1639,42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422,428 (1995); Ellis v. Pierce, 230
Cal. App. 3d 1557, 1560, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1991); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260,
1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Funke, 531 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995);
Alexander v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 644 So. 2d 238, 243 (La. 1994),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995); Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609
So. 2d 790, 795-97 (La. 1992); State v. Jones, 666 A.2d 128, 132 (Md. 1995); Johnson v.
State, 622 A.2d 199, 205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Kvitka v. Board of Registration, 551
N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d
598,601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014,1016 (Crim. Ct. 1995);
State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 53 (N.D. 1995); Johnson v. State, 882 S.W.2d 17, 18
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510,514 (Vt. 1992); State v. Naydihor, 483
N.W.2d 253, 258-59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
213. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 298; 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 36; Woods, 949 F.2d at
177; Bizzell, 921 F.2d at 266-67; Mayers, 897 F.2d at 1127; Oakes, 872 F. Supp. at 825;
Zerkel, 900 P.2d at 747-48; State v. Nichols, 819 P.2d 995, 998 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991);
Baldwin, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 1639,42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428; Ellis, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1560,
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As noted previously, license revocations and suspensions are not
such rare cases. 24 But assuming that they were, Halper requires
that the sanction carry a heavy punitive or deterrent aspect in order
to be deemed punishment for Fifth Amendment purposes.
21
These elements are not evident in license suspensions or
revocations for several reasons. First, a civil sanction is "characteristi-
cally free of the punitive criminal element" when it involves a
revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted.2 16 Most state courts
have ruled that a driver's license is such a privilege and not a
fundamental right.217 As a result, the revocation or suspension of
a drunk driver's license is nonpunitive because the person disobeyed
the law and thereby failed to follow the terms that govern continued
use of the privilege.
Another reason the suspension or revocation is nonpunitive is
that it is comparable to confiscating an instrument used to perpetrate
a crime. In the case of drunk drivers the license is, in a sense, the
instrument used to commit the crime because a person is technically
not allowed to drive without it. Courts almost unanimously deem
forfeitures of crime instruments as being nonpunitive because to do
otherwise would allow the perpetrator to profit from the crime or put
the community at risk.218 In a similar manner, a drunk driver would
also endanger the public if allowed to indefinitely use the license after
arrest.
An even closer analogy exists between suspensions of drivers'
licenses and suspensions of professional licenses. The latter are
generally deemed nonpunitive, even though the suspension prevents
282 Cal. Rptr. at 94; Freeman, 611 So. 2d at 1261; Funke, 531 N.W.2d at 126; Alexander,
644 So. 2d at 243; Butler, 609 So. 2d at 795-97; Johnson, 622 A.2d at 202-03; Kvitka, 551
N.E.2d at 918; Hanson, 532 N.W.2d at 601; Johnson, 882 S.W.2d at 19; Strong, 605 A.2d
at 514; Tench v. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d 922, 924-25 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Naydihor,
483 N.W.2d at 258-59.
214. See supra part IV.B.
215. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
216. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
217. Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 392, 397-98, 657 P.2d
383, 387-88, 188 Cal. Rptr. 891, 895-96 (1983); People v. Zinn, 843 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Colo.
1993); Jackson v. State, 462 S.E.2d 802, 803 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Marbut v. Motor Vehicle
Dep't, 400 P.2d 982, 984-85 (Kan. 1965); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Me.
1995); Prichard v. Battle, 17 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Va. 1941).
218. United States v. $145,139, 18 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 72
(1994); Tilley, 18 F.3d 295; United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1992); 38
Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 36.
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a person from working in the person's chosen field.219 One primary
reason for barring double jeopardy in these cases is that the state
would otherwise be prevented from revoking a license and later
punishing the professional in a related criminal matter.' For
example, if the suspension of a license was considered punitive or
deterrent in nature, a state that suspended a lawyer's license for
fraudulent work would then be prevented from initiating a later
criminal proceeding for the same violation. 1  This would throw
disciplinary actions against professionals into turmoil and would make
little or no sense. It would also be nonsensical to label suspensions
or revocations of drivers' licenses as punitive. If preventing someone
from working in a certain field is not punishment then a revocation
or suspension of a driver's license could not possibly be punitive,
either. Any other conclusion defies logic.
It would be equally unsound to label license suspensions as
heavily punitive when they are actually remedial and are done to
protect the public.' As many courts and commentators have
noted, drunk driving is a serious problem that results in numerous
deaths each year.tm  It is, therefore, dangerous to allow those
arrested for drunk driving to get back in their cars. The only sensible
method of dealing with the problem is to remove them from the
highways where they pose a danger to others. The suspension or
revocation of licenses is a quick and easy method to ensure the
public's safety and is not disproportionate to the potential dangers the
driver has presented. This remedial goal is supported by statistics
which show that states with automatic license suspensions or
219. Bae, 44 F.3d at 494 (stating that suspension of medical license was not punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause); Schillerstrom v. State, 885 P.2d 156, 158 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994) (concerning suspension of chiropractor's license); Kaplan v. Department of
Registration & Educ., 361 N.E.2d 626, 631 (IM. App. Ct. 1977) (concerning suspension of
medical license); Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Comm'rs, 428 S.E.2d 71,73 (Ga. 1993)
(concerning suspension of business license); Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d
705,711-12 (Haw. 1995) (concerning suspension of medical license); Alexander, 644 So. 2d
at 243-44 (concerning suspension of a medical license); Kvitka, 551 N.E.2d at 918 n.4
(concerning suspension of medical license).
220. See, e.g., Scott Interview, supra note 165.
221. Id.
222. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
223. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 n.9 (1978); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,
439 (1957); Griffen, supra note 2, at 1373-74.
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revocations have seen a dramatic drop in the number of alcohol-
related fatalities and accidents. 4
Thus, the primary focus of the suspension/revocation statutes is
to protect the public and not to punish the offender or deter others.
Since Halper requires a heavy punitive or deterrent quality before a
law violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, the suspension or revoca-
tion of a driver's license falls outside the parameters of the Fifth
Amendment.
2. The suspension or revocation of a driver's license is also
nonpunitive in nature under the factors used
-in Austin' and Kurth Ranch 6
DUI double-jeopardy proponents contend that the suspension or
revocation of a license is punishment under the factors used by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Austin and Kurth Ranch. 7 Rather than
using the entire set of factors, however, they tend to concentrate on
the ones most favorable to their argument. This strategy distorts their
analysis and leads to the erroneous conclusion that a license suspen-
sion or revocation is punishment. A more accurate view of the
situation, however, can only be reached by analyzing all of the factors.
This process entails giving weight to the historical understanding of
224. See THIRD READING OF S.B. 1623, supra note 152 (stating that studies in
Alabama, California, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin have shown that driver's
license revocation reduces accidents); Stein, supra note 6, at A3 (stating that alcohol-
related traffic deaths fell 7.7% in the year following license suspensions for drivers testing
over the legal limit).
225. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
226. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
227. See, e.g., Taylor, License Suspensions, supra note 9, at 83-84. DUI double-jeopardy
proponents periodically cite to United States v. $485,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-346). The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the Austin factors in its analysis of the double-
jeopardy issue being resolved in the $405,089.23 U.S. Currency case. Id. at 1220-22. At
this point it is difficult to fully and accurately ascertain how the U.S. Supreme Court's
impending decision in the $405,089.23 U.S. Currency case will affect the DUI double-
jeopardy argument. If the Court finds that double jeopardy is not applicable, most courts
will probably refuse to find that double jeopardy applies in the DUI arena since the drunk-
driving related forfeiture of a driver's license is even less punitive in nature than the
forfeiture of valuable property or large sums of money due to drug offenses. If the court
finds that double jeopardy does apply, however, the wording of the case will determine
how the DUI double-jeopardy argument is strengthened or weakened. Arguably, the case
would not apply since the $405,089.23 U.S. Currency case is factually distinguishable from
DUI cases. See supra note 186.
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forfeiture as punishment.s It also involves determining whether:
the sanctioned activity is completely forbidden; the people arrested
for the crime are the only ones subject to the sanction; the statute
focuses on the culpability of the defendant and the commission of a
crime; the sanction is imposed only after the defendant is arrested for
the precise conduct that gives rise to the sanction; the sanction is
levied on goods that the defendant does not own or possess; and the
legislative body either understood the statute to be punitive or the
purpose of the statute was to punish or deter. 9
The first factor weighs in favor of double-jeopardy proponents
since the U.S. Supreme Court decreed in Austin that civil forfeiture
has been historically viewed as punishment.3 This factor alone,
however, is not dispositive, as shown by the fact that the Court
analyzed all of the factors listed in Austin before rendering a decision
on whether the civil sanction in that case was punitive.231
Another factor that supports the double-jeopardy argument is
that the sanctioned activity-testing above the legal limit or refusing
to take a chemical test when requested to do so by a police officer-is
completely forbidden. 32
Several of the other factors, however, are not as clear. Thus, one
could argue that people arrested for drunk driving are the only ones
subjected to a suspension for refusing to take a test or testing over the
legal limit. In a broader sense, however, there are many other traffic
violations that result in the suspension or revocation of a driver's
license. 3
The fourth and fifth factors-whether the statute focuses on the
culpability of the defendant and the commission of a crime and
whether the sanction is imposed only after the defendant is arrested
for the precise conduct that gives rise to the sanction-also support
both sides of the double-jeopardy debate. In the case of those who
fail the blood-alcohol tests, the suspension of the license is indeed
228. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
229. Id.; Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946-48.
230. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810.
231. Id. at 2812.
232. See supra part III.
233. For example, in Delaware there is a mandatory license revocation for vehicular
homicides, vehicular assaults, perjured statements made to the state department of motor
vehicles, failure to stop after an accident resulting in death or injury, the commission of
any felony with a motor vehicle, and attempts to flee from a police officer. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 2732 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
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linked to the criminal culpability of the defendant, and the defendant
is indeed arrested for the precise conduct which gives rise to the
sanction. When a license is suspended or revoked for refusal to take
a test, however, the sanction is not directly linked to the culpability
of the defendant or the commission of a crime, nor is the defendant
arrested for the refusal. Instead, the cause of the suspension is the act
of refusing, not the act of driving under the influence. Because the
refusal is not.criminal behavior the defendant's culpability is not at
issue, thereby diminishing the double-jeopardy argument.2
This argument is further weakened by the other factors. For
example, licensed drunk drivers do indeed possess their drivers'
licenses. Thus, they are unlike the defendants in Kurth Ranch, who
grew marijuana on their farm but did not "own" or "possess" the drug
since to do so would be illegal 5
Legislative knowledge and the purpose of the drunk driving
statutes are even more damaging to double-jeopardy proponents. In
fact, these linchpins of the double-jeopardy argument are, ironically,
also the key weaknesses. The biggest reason is that although legis-
lative history can be contradictory and difficult to ascertain, much
evidence and precedent suggest that these measures were designed to
protect the public, rather than punish the drunk driver. 6
One method of analyzing legislative intent, for example, is to
analyze how legislators or supporters of a law describe it to the
media. Using this analysis, double-jeopardy proponents often contend
that legislators or supporters sometimes refer to suspension or
revocation measures as sanctions or penalties. 7  Yet, for every
punitive-purpose quote gleaned from a newspaper by DUI attorneys,
234. But see ALASKA STAT. § 28.33.031(f) (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (1994
& Supp. 1995) (stating that refusal is a misdemeanor); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23159 (West
Supp. 1996) (listing possible penalties if person refuses test and is later convicted of driving
under the influence); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121(1)(6) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that
refusal to submit to test is "a crime"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(3) (1988 & Supp.
1990) (stating that refusal is a misdemeanor); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.3(b) (1994)
(stating that refusal of a preliminary test is an infraction); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-
406(a)(3) (1993 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing the officer to charge the person with violating
the law for refusing to submit to a test). As noted previously, however, punishing
someone for refusal to take a test and punishing someone for drunk driving would
constitute separate offenses for double-jeopardy purposes. See supra part IV.A.
235. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. The Court also stated that the marijuana was not
owned or possessed by the defendants at the time the tax was imposed because the drug
had previously been destroyed by the state. Id.
236. See infra notes 238-56 and accompanying text.
237. See supra part III.C.3.d.
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a number of nonpunitive quotes exist in the same articles. For
example, when California passed a license revocation/suspension law
for those who test over the legal limit, a few supporters called it a
"penalty," while three law-enforcement officials and one spokesperson
for the Department of Motor Vehicles stated that the main purpose
of the law was to protect the public. 8 In addition, an official from
MADD, the primary force behind many suspension/revocation laws,
has stated to the press that: the "reasoning behind [the proce-
dure]-and one of the reasons it is an effective measure-is it
provides a swift, certain, and prompt measure to remove from the
road fairly quickly someone who was driving under the influence and
endangering the public." 9
This viewpoint is supported by a handful of states which
specifically declare in their statutes that the suspension laws are
enacted to protect the public.240 Most jurisdictions, however, do not
explicitly delineate the purpose of their suspension measures. Thus,
the only way to determine the intent of the statute is to research the
legislative history of the law.
These background materials generally show that license suspen-
sion/revocation laws were passed for both punitive and safety reasons.
This interpretation is clearly supported by the legislative history of a
California law authorizing suspension of licenses for those testing over
the legal limit.241 For example, the Senate Bill that initiated the law
stated that the purpose of the then-proposed statute was to ensure the
safety of motorists.242 The third reading of the bill, however, stated
that one of the purposes was to provide a "swift and sure" suspension
238. Lait & Maharaj, supra note 151, at B1. For example, one officer stated that "[t]he
important thing is that the new law will keep people from getting hurt." Id. at B8.
239. Smith, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting Bob Shearouse, MADD's public policy director).
240. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-2-126(a) (Supp. 1995) (stating that the purpose
is "[t]o provide safety for all persons using the highways ... by quickly revoking the
driver's license of any person who has shown himself or herself to be a safety hazard by
driving with an excessive amount of alcohol in his or her body"); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-
55 (1994) (stating that drunk drivers are "a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and
safety of the general public"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2453(1)(A)-(B) (West
Supp. 1995) (stating that the purpose is to "provide maximum safety for all persons who
travel on or otherwise use the public ways" and to "remove quickly from public ways those
persons who have shown themselves to be a safety hazard"); see also City of Maumee v.
Anistik, 632 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ohio 1994) (stating that the Ohio implied-consent statute
was passed by the general assembly so that "needless tragedies" would be avoided).
241. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353.2 (West Supp. 1996).
242. CALIFORNIA S.B. 1623, 1989-1990 Regular Sess. 3-4 (1989).
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as a deterrent to drunk driving.243 The Senate Committee on the
Judiciary reiterated those statements,2  as did the Assembly Com-
mittee on Public Safety, although the latter also mentioned the
possible reduction in fatal alcohol-related accidents.245 In a similar
manner, a legislative analysis of the proposed statute referred to the
measure as a "penalty," but also said it was a step towards reducing
drunk-driving related injuries and deaths.246 The enacted version of
the bill, however, only stated a remedial intent by declaring that
"[t]he purpose of this act is to... provide safety for all persons using
the highways.of this state by quickly suspending the driving privilege
of those persons who have shown themselves to be safety hazards by
driving with an excessive concentration of alcohol in their bodies.9
247
The governor reiterated this remedial purpose by stating that he
signed the bill into law because it "would enhance traffic safety."
248
Thus, the legislative history does not show a solely punitive or
solely remedial purpose behind the statute. Instead, punitive goals
can be found and remedial goals are not only evident, but emphasized
by the enacted law itsel 249 Because a statute must "only" serve
deterrent or punitive purposes to be considered punishment,"0 the
suspension law falls outside the parameters of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.2s'
243. THIRD READING OF S.B. 1623, supra note 152, at 3.
244. CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE REP. FOR S.B.
1623, 1989-1990 Regular Sess. 3 (1989).
245. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE REP. FOR S.B.
1623, 1989-1990 Regular Sess. 3 (1989).
246. LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1623, supra note 153, at 1-2.
247. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 1460, § 1.
248. Id.; see also People v. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Crim. Ct. 1995) (quoting
a 1954 New York governor's memorandum as stating that the New York suspension law
would give law enforcement the tools "with which to rid our highways" of "one of the
worst hazards." Id. The sentiment was reiterated in a 1980 governor's memorandum
which stated that the law would diminish the number of "senseless and tragic deaths"
caused by drunk drivers. Id.).
249. See supra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
250. See supra part IV.C.1.
251. A few state courts have interpreted their statutes to be remedial in nature even
when faced with legislative histories that indicate a punitive intent behind such laws. See,
e.g., Nichols, 819 P.2d at 999 (finding a remedial purpose even though the minutes of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that the law was a sanction and was designed
to be a penalty); Davidson, 656 So. 2d at 223-24 (finding a remedial purpose even though
legislative history stated that the law was passed to prevent, punish, and discourage
criminal behavior).
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In addition to legislative history, however, several states further
emphasize the safety aspects of their laws by preventing the return of
a revoked or suspended driver's license until the offender has
attended a drug or alcohol dependency class or treatment pro-
gram 2 If their statutes were meant to punish people, the legisla-
ture would not have linked recovery of a driver's license to programs
designed to ensure that a driver would be safe once he or she began
driving again."s Thus, these measures can only be seen as enhanc-
ing the safety aspects of the suspension/revocation laws.
The strongest support, however, for finding a "fairly" remedial
purpose behind such statutes is the case law of many states. Although
not all of these state courts have analyzed their license suspen-
sion/revocation statutes for double-jeopardy violations, 4 they have
almost universally stated that suspending or revoking an alleged
drunk driver's license is done to make the streets safer for the general
public.5 As one court declared, the primary objective of such
252. Sample Memorandum, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 17, in Memorandum from Mother's Against Drunk Driving, supra note 159; see,
e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-692.01(A), (G) (1989).
253. Sample Memorandum, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 18, in Memorandum from Mother's Against Drunk Driving, supra note 159; see,
e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a)(6), (7) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
254. See, e.g., Beamon v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 180 Cal. App. 2d 200, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 396 (1960); State v. Bowles, 311 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1973); Barnes v. Tofany, 261 N.E.2d
617 (N.Y. 1970); State v. Sinner, 207 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1973); Blow v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 164 N.W.2d 351 (S.D. 1969); Prichard v. Battle, 17 S.E.2d 393 (Va. 1941).
255. Zerkel, 900 P.2d at 744; Schade v. Department of Transp., 857 P.2d 1314, 1316
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Baldwin, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 1641-42,42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430; Ellis,
230 Cal. App. 3d at 1561-62, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (1991); Beamon, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 210,
4 Cal. Rptr. at 403; Cordova v. Mansheim, 725 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986);
Freeman, 611 So. 2d at 1261; State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995); People v.
Talavera, 905 P.2d 633, 638 (Idaho 1995); People v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill.
1988); State v. Maze, 825 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Butler, 609 So. 2d at 796;
State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Me. 1995); Johnson, 622 A.2d at 203-04; Heddan
v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 63 (Minn. 1983); State v. Spilde, 536 N.W.2d 639, 641
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Hanson, 532 N.W.2d at 601; Bowles, 311 A.2d at 302 (stating that
license revocations in the case of habitual offenders are not criminal sanctions, but are
done instead to remove unsafe drivers from the road); State v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044,
1057 (N.M. 1995); Barnes, 261 N.E.2d at 620; State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 56
(N.D. 1995); Sinner, 207 N.W.2d at 501; Doyle v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 554
N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1990); State v. Hurbean, 261 N.E.2d 290, 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970);
Price v. Reed, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Okla. 1986); Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester, 501 P.2d
1099, 1102 (Okla. 1972); Blow, 164 N.W.2d at 353; State v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d 435, 437
(Tenn. 1982); Strong, 605 A.2d at 513-14; Huffman v. Commonwealth, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789
(Va. 1970); Prichard, 17 S.E.2d at 396; Tench v. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d 922, 924 (Va.
Ct. App. 1995); Fritts v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 492 P.2d 558,562 (Wash. Ct. App.
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statutes is to relieve the public of this danger because "the, catastro-
phes associated with drunk driving, the tragic loss of life and the
permanent debilitating injuries that can result have reached nearly
epidemic proportions across the nation.",16  Because these state
cases deal specifically with drunk driving and license suspen-
sion/revocation statutes, they are binding precedent showing that the
primary goal of such laws is to protect the public from intoxicated
motorists.
The U.S. Supreme Court has often upheld the power of the state
to protect its citizens against such dangers. In the license suspen-
sion/revocation context, this is most strongly stated in Mackey v.
Montrym,"7 in which the Court held that such laws were both valid
and constitutional exercises of a state government interest to remove
drunk drivers from the streets.z 8
The Court also upheld such laws in Dixon v. Love, 9 in which
the Court concluded that the suspension of a driver's license could be
done without a presuspension hearing." The Court buttressed its
opinion by pointing to the "visible and weighty" public interest in
safety and the fact that the statute was meant to remove drivers who
are unable or unwilling to respect traffic rules and the safety of
others.
2 6'
Similarly, in Breithaupt v. Abram, 262 the Court stated that
administering a blood-alcohol test while the defendant was uncon-
scious after an accident was not a violation of the driver's constitu-
tional rights because of the "increasing slaughter" caused by drunk
drivers.263 Since the number of fatalities had reached "the astound-
ing figure only heard of on the battlefield," the interests of society in
preventing one of the "mortal hazards of the road" outweighed any
interests of the defendant.26
The Court has also held that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test
can be used as evidence against a defendant because the test is a safe,
1971).
256. City of Columbus v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio 1984).
257. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
258. Id. at 17.
259. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
260. Id. at 115.
261. Id.
262. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
263. Id. at 439.
264. Id.
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painless, and commonplace method of meeting a "clearly legitimate"
need for the information."6 In so holding, the Court noted that it
had "repeatedly lamented the tragedy" caused by drunk driving
before concluding that the test was a valid use of state power.2 6
The assessment that drunk driving exacts a heavy toll has also led
the Court to uphold sobriety checkpoints267 and license suspensions
in which the officer failed to list specific reasons leading him or her
to conclude that the defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol.2
Thus, the suspension or revocation of a license is strongly related
to the legitimate government purpose of protecting the safety of the
motoring public. This conclusion is supported not only by case law,
but also by the legislative history of such statutes. As a result, license
suspensions/revocations do not solely serve retributive or deterrent
goals and are, therefore, not punishment for double-jeopardy
purposes. As a result, states can suspend or revoke a drunk driver's
license and then file criminal charges without violating the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Any argument to the contrary should be declared
dead on arrival.
V. METHODS FOR AVOIDING THE DUI DOUBLE-JEOPARDY
DEFENSE IN THE FUTURE
A. Overview
If the current trend continues, most state appellate or state
supreme courts will eventually declare that double jeopardy does not
apply to the suspension or revocation of licenses and will consign the
argument to the burial that it deserves. Before that happens,
however, many states may be forced to engage in costly litigation to
finally settle the matter. Other states, which currently do not have
these suspension or revocation measures, may avoid enacting such
laws in order to prevent such hassles. This would be tragic since
license suspensions/revocations are one of the most sensible and
effective measures of lowering drunk-driving-related accidents and
265. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983).
266. Id. at 558, 563.
267. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (stating that the
magnitude of the drunk driving problem was indisputable and that the states had an
interest in eradicating it).
268. Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 1119 (1983).
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fatalities.269 For states that are interested in avoiding such challeng-
es, they can either change their laws or adopt laws in such a way as
to avoid such problems.
B. Enact Statutes That Explicitly State That the Purpose of
Revoking or Suspending a Driver's License Is to Keep
the Public Safe
Because DUI proponents often look at the legislative history of
statutes to determine whether they are.punitive for double-jeopardy
purposes," states can avoid needless litigation on this issue by
including a provision in the statute stating that the purpose of license
revocations/suspensions is to keep the public safe. This would
preclude any misinterpretation of the statute as a punitive measure
since the intention of the legislature is clearly indicated in the law
itself. Drunk drivers would, thus, be effectively prevented from fully
developing the strongest element of their double-jeopardy argument.
To further ensure this goal, state legislatures should also ensure
that the law as written not only explicitly states that it is a remedial
effort, but also remove any indications that the law is punitive or that
it acts as a deterrent. This would include removing such words as
"sanction" or "penalty" because they could be interpreted as words
of punishment even if they are not intended in that way."7
C. Combine the License Suspension/Revocation Proceedings and
the Criminal Charges in the Same Proceeding
As the Halper272 case notes, the government can seek civil and
criminal penalties in the same proceeding as long as it is authorized
by the legislature.273 Thus, another way to prevent the DUI double-
jeopardy argument is to combine both the license suspen-
sion/revocation hearing and the criminal trial in the same proceeding.
This would still permit the police to confiscate the license at the scene
of the arrest and issue a temporary license, while simultaneously
preventing any sort of specious double-jeopardy argument.
In order to accomplish this, the license suspension or revocation
hearing should be one of the many pretrial matters adjudicated by the
269. Stein, supra note 6, at A3.
270. See supra part III.C.3.d.
271. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 9-11.
272. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
273. Id. at 450.
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judge who is overseeing the criminal trial. A preponderance of the
evidence standard should be applied,274 and the court should base
its decision on whether the officer had probable or reasonable cause
to believe the defendant was driving under the influence,275 whether
the defendant was advised of the consequences of either refusing a
test or taking a test and failing, whether the defendant was arrested
for driving under the influence, and whether the defendant refused to
take the test or tested over the legal limit. In addition, the state
should be allowed to prove these factors by presenting the police
officer's report or affadavit in lieu of calling the officer to testify.
These methods would allow the court to informally and quickly
resolve the matter, which is the main goal of the license suspen-
sion/revocation hearings currently used by most states.276 The
benefit of retaining the informal nature and relaxed evidentiary
standards is that it prevents the hearing from turning into an intensely
litigated trial-like proceeding. At the same time, the defendant is
precluded from making a double-jeopardy argument since the
suspension is done in the same proceeding as the criminal trial.
D. Wait Until the Double-Jeopardy Trend is
Declared Dead on Arrival
For many states it would be a needless waste of money to go
through a lengthy legislative process in an effort to pass a law that is
impervious to any type of double-jeopardy argument. This is
especially true of states with binding case law stating that the
suspension/revocation statutes are remedial in nature.277 For these
states the better course of action would be to wait until the use of the
double-jeopardy argument subsides. Eventually, this will happen
because higher courts will agree that the double-jeopardy defense is
unfounded and will consign it to extinction.
274. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-126(9)(C)(I) (West Supp. 1995).
275. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
276. People v. Moore, 561 N.E.2d 648, 651-52 (Ill. 1990); State v. Ratliff, 744 P.2d 247,
250 (Or. 1987); see also Berkman, supra note 11, at A7 (quoting Robert Shearouse,
director of public policy for MADD, as saying that the goal of such measures is to
"remove intoxicated drivers from the highway as quickly as possible").
277. See supra note 255.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the drunk-driving double-jeopardy defense is currently
a "defense du jour" '78 and is sometimes used with great success at
the trial-court level, it is built on an untenable argument. The defense
attempts to apply cases that are so vastly different from drunk driving
that it makes no sense to apply them in the context of license
suspensions or revocations.
Assuming that they were viable in the drunk-driving arena, the
argument would still fail to withstand judicial scrutiny. The primary
reason is that the suspension or revocation of a driver's license
following the arrest of the defendant for drunk driving is primarily
remedial in nature and designed to ensure the safety of the motoring
public. Thus, the imposition of a suspension or a revocation is not
solely punitive and does not raise double-jeopardy concerns. As a
result, the DUI double-jeopardy defense should be declared D.O.A.
by courts faced with this matter.
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278. Smith, supra note 8, at 5.
* I would like to thank my parents for all their years of support and encouragement.
I would also like to thank Professor Linda Beres for her assistance on this Comment and
in other areas of law-school life. Finally, I would like to thank Karen Rinehart for being
a friend and a law-school mentor.
